INTRODUCTION
In spite of Lord Lloyd's observation, the centenary of federation has given many Australian lawyers the impetus to do just that, to consider the 'ultimate source' of authority for the Australian Constitution. The general aim of this article is to assess the legal basis of the Australian Constitution and, more specifically, how 'autochthony' 1 for the Constitution might be achieved. Part I notes that as a result of the Australia Acts, some members of the High Court have instigated a move away from the traditional basis of the Constitution, the United Kingdom Parliament, to a new basis in popular sovereignty. However, as it could be said that the Australia Acts only dealt unequivocally with 'autonomy', and not 'autochthony', this move is dubious. Whether _____________________________________________________________________________________ * This analogy is drawn from Professor Frank Scott's work where he relates an eastern myth to describe the Canadian Constitution as an elephant standing upon the turtle of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. It is said that all former Dominions and colonies must eventually remove the Imperial turtle and replace it with a local one, but without destabilising the whole superstructure. See generally, Frank Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics (1977) 246-250. However, even after patriation of the Canadian Constitution, 'it is not entirely clear whether in the sense intended by Professor Scott, Canada now has its own turtle', Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions (1984) 206. This article will assess attempts at installing a local Australian turtle as similarly equivocal. ** BA LLB (Hons) (JCU). Postgraduate student, James Cook University. I would like to thank Graham Nicholson and Peter Oliver for the benefit of comments made on an earlier draft of this article. A shorter version of this article was delivered to the 19th Annual Conference of the Australia and New Zealand Law and History Society, Australian National University, Canberra, 6 July 2000. 1 Autochthony is concerned with how 'at some stage, a state must cease to be the offspring and derivative of an Imperial predecessor and exist as a complete and self-contained entity, as a law-constitutive fact itself', Phillip Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (1993) 398. In contemporary Australia, this notion has taken on some importance in both academic and judicial circles because 'the position with respect to autonomy is satisfactory, [but] the position with respect to autochthony is by no means as strong', Mark Moshinsky, 'Re-enacting the Constitution in an Australian Act ' (1989) 18 Federal Law Review 134, 135.
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The Legal Basis of the Australian Constitution 245 ____________________________________________________________________________________
The legal source of the Constitution is the United Kingdom Parliament, because Australia's constitutional arrangements are still legally derived from, but not subordinate to, 19 the United Kingdom Parliament which enacted the Constitution as (part of, not merely a schedule to) one of its statutes. This statute, even after the Australia Acts, has not ceased to hold its paramount status. It is clear that existing Imperial Acts applicable to Australia in 1986, continue in force after 1986 until amended or repealed by valid Australian legislation. 20 This applies particularly to the Constitution Act, and the Constitution it incorporates. As John Daley has noted: 'One can only identify the provisions of [the Constitution] exhaustively by reference to the enactments of the Imperial Parliament… [Therefore] a body may remain the authority for legislation made in the past, even if that body lacks the authority to legislate in the present'. 21 Moreover, 'there is no difficulty ... as long as authority is distinguished from continuing power ... Thus the common law may recognise the Westminster Parliament as the authority for the Australian Constitution and also recognise that any continuing power in the Westminster Parliament has ceased'. 22 Therefore, any attempt by the Westminster Parliament to repeal or amend any of Australia's basic constitutive documents would be met with Australian rejection and disdain. In all probability, the High Court would regard the unwanted law as having no status at all: the law would be a nullity in Australia. 23 As Geoffrey Marshall has noted: '[P]reservation of the British historical and legal root is compatible with its being the case that the Westminster Parliament is no longer able to legislate for [Australia]…' 24 The political source of the Constitution might be the people of Australia (or possibly the electorate) 25 because in political terms, 'the Constitution ultimately depends for its _____________________________________________________________________________________ 19 In this respect I question Joseph's interpretation, above n 1, 397, of the effects of one legal system being derived from another. This article rejects the view that a legally derived (but now fully autonomous) system must necessarily in any way (historically or otherwise) remain subordinate. As Professor Winterton has noted, '[i]t is surely to confuse continuity with subordination'. Winterton above n 16, 7, quoting Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory (1971) 63. See also, John Daley, The Bases for the Authority of the Australian Constitution (1999) unpublished D Phil thesis, Oxford, ch 5.3 (copy on file with author): '[A] legislature whose authority is derived from a source need not remain subordinate to that source' and further ' [T] he rhetorical desire to assert that Australia's constitutional law is independent of any other country is [often] based on the mistaken belief that derivation from a source implies subordination' ibid ch 5.6.3. Further, although a break in legal continuity would deny legal derivation, there would never be any point in denying Australia's historical derivation. 20 Australia (1979) 145 CLR 172, 195 (Gibbs J 21 Daley, above n 19, ch 5.3. 22 Detmold, above n 15, 95. See also, Moshinsky, above n 1, 144. 23 Also noted by Hogg, above n 2, 56 in relation to Canada. See, the comments of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Sue v Hill (1999) 163 ALR 648, 666 where the same is implicit. 24 Marshall, above n 11, 207 (emphasis added). Moshinsky similarly notes, 'acceptance of the traditional view that we do not have an autochthonous constitution, does not necessarily mean that the British Parliament can repeal or amend the Constitution Act', above n 1, 136. 
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Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ continuing validity upon the acceptance of the people, but the same may be said of any form of government which is not arbitrary'. 26 As such 'the Constitution is only "homegrown" in a practical, not legal, sense'. 27 Further, it is in this practical sense only, that the people of Australia should be regarded as ultimately sovereign.
Several 31 However, four years later Mason reiterated his views from ACTV about the passage of the Australia Acts, but stated that it was now possible to say 'that political sovereignty resides in the people'. 32 In this respect the word 'political' is substituted for the word 'ultimate' as used in ACTV. On the other hand, Dawson J appears to have consistently used 'ultimate' to signify 'political' sovereignty, in the sense that the people's will is ultimately obeyed.
The Australia Acts and Autochthony
Nicholas Aroney has suggested that some members of the High Court have 'recently expressed interest in finding an autochthonous source for the Australian constitutional system'. 33 Often, this trend has been based upon consideration of the Australia Acts. However, it is not clear that the scheme of the Australia Acts amounted to such an invitation. In confirming that Australia is autonomous, some Justices 34 have made a
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Constitution is however, a matter of some controversy. The Legal Basis of the Australian Constitution 247 ____________________________________________________________________________________ further step in reasoning, which does not necessarily follow. They have argued that the traditional legal basis of the Australian Constitution has been discarded because it can no longer sustain the perceived practical reality of a substituted basis; that is, the sovereignty of the Australian people.
I agree with comments that such assertions amount to a 'radical relocation of sovereignty' 35 and 'grossly exaggerate the impact of the Australia Act 1986 (UK)'. 36 As Moshinsky has noted, it is not clear that the legal independence of Australia brought about by the passage of the Australia Acts has 'altered the source of the authority of our Constitution'. 37 Independence does not necessarily imply a legal break. To be sure, although the Australia Acts did sever the future legal relationship between the United Kingdom and Australia, legal continuity was preserved and no constitutional void resulted. However, there certainly existed a gap in Australian domestic legislative power. The Acts dealt with this by regularising and recognising Australia's legal separation, and should therefore be correctly interpreted as a remedial redistribution of British legislative authority, to fill the gap in favour of the Australian parliaments. In effect, the supremacy of the Australian parliaments under the Constitution was substituted for the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament. 38
A critique -federal compact
If one adopts the view that the Australia Acts created a void 39 in constitutional authority, it might well be necessary to discern an 'alternative' (but maybe even only 'additional') local legal constitutional source. 40 After all, it is recognised that our legal However, popular sovereignty is only one possibility, it is not the 'default setting'. Others include authority derived from a divine being, or from the State itself, or from indigenous-non-indigenous reconciliation or even from provincial autonomy reflected in a federal compact. 41 This article argues that if the traditional legal basis is to be discarded by the High Court, a federal compact between the colonies as polities, (or even the people of the colonies) is a more historically correct interpretation of federation than a social contract 42 based upon popular sovereignty. Whilst the agreement between the colonies to federate was not legally binding because the Constitution obtained its juristic force from the United Kingdom Parliament, the absence of that parliament from Australia's constitutional arrangements might require a fresh analysis of the legal status of the agreement. Further, the potentially powerful effect of the unanimity evident in the passage of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) and the resultant 'unanimity procedure' embodied in s 15 of the Act adds weight to the argument that the Constitution may now be seen as a compact. A similar view has recently been espoused by Nicholas Aroney: [M]ost accounts of the search for the basic rule [of the Australian legal system] have been skewed by an (unhistorical) camber in favour of regarding the Australian 'people' as an undifferentiated (and rather undefined) whole, without regard to the States into which they are organised and, more importantly, without regard to the federative compact which, from an autochthonous and legal point of view, brought the federation into being. 47 Therefore, it is now open for some to view the Constitution as a federal compact, as it is open for others to view it as social contract. Indeed, the federal compact view has a much stronger historical pedigree. James Thomson has noted:
'[h]istorically, the Australian Constitution was not formally approved by the people acting as a collective entity. Rather it was endorsed by enfranchised citizens voting as members of individual and distinct colonies '. 48 This views the people who voted to accept federation as inhabitants of their respective colonies (and of course British subjects), not citizens of the Commonwealth 49 organised into a single national unit. A problem common to both 'social contract' and 'federal compact' paradigms, however, is that it might (although not necessarily) involve a preEngineers 50 approach to interpretation. This might require 'an interpretation of the Constitution ... which is formed on a vague, individual conception of the spirit of the compact [or contract]'. 51
Popular sovereignty
In spite of the Australia Acts' limited mandate, many sponsors of popular sovereignty have cited their passage as the decisive and defining moment for the ascendancy of popular sovereignty and the acquisition of autochthony. Mason CJ in ACTV was emphatic that 'the Australia Act 1986 (UK) marked the end of the legal sovereignty of _____________________________________________________________________________________ 44 Zines, above n 16, 308. Aroney, above n 33, 288 (emphases added). 47 However, one problem is that for the federal compact to create an autochthonous Commonwealth, the colonies would need to be considered autochthonous. This might be difficult in light of the countervailing necessity to refer to Imperial legislation in their creation. For, how do the people voice their 'ultimate sovereignty' if not by some legally created mechanism (the colonies) and which body created that mechanism (The Imperial Parliament)? 48 Thomson, above n 16, 1201. 49 Finn, above n 38, 3, n 15. 
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Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the Imperial Parliament and recognised that ultimate sovereignty resided in the Australian people'. 52 On one level it is difficult to dispute the first proposition of Mason CJ's statement. However, does it necessarily follow that the beneficiary of this relinquishing of sovereign power is the Australian populace and not the Australian parliaments? Where is it recognised that this redistribution of Westminster sovereignty should become the property of, and 'embedded in' 53 the Australian people?
Neither version of the Australia Acts make any reference to 'the people of Australia', let alone anything that could be construed as an invocation of the 'people as a legislator', or even a declaration of popular sovereignty. Moreover, as the local version was not approved by referendum, the scheme of the Australia Acts could not be said to have taken place within a popular framework. In fact, the scheme took place within a federal framework, based squarely on state unanimity. The Australia Act 1986 (Cth) was enacted pursuant to s 51(xxxviii) of the Constitution, that is, by the Commonwealth Parliament at the request and concurrence of all the States. This unanimity then authorised the United Kingdom legislation (pursuant to s 4 of the Statute of Westminster) at the request and with the consent of, the Commonwealth Parliament and Government.
Popular sovereignty is, in terms of Australia's constitutional arrangements, an ahistorical 54 and nebulous 55 concept. Many of its proponents, however, are not deterred by mere history (constitutional or otherwise) and consequently 'admit that the paradigm ... is not justified by history, but argue that this dissonance is irrelevant'. 56 Many sponsors point to the fact that an unstated premise of the Australia Acts is that s 128 is now the only method of altering the Constitution, and that by 
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The Legal Basis of the Australian Constitution 251 ____________________________________________________________________________________ virtue of its popular provisions, the people (as a single national unit) are now the legal source of constitutional authority. 57 However, at least five points can be made in response: • First, the location of a power to amend the Constitution might not be the best indicium of municipal sovereignty -or of autochthony for that matter -and may be merely a 'procedural condition precedent'. 58 In this sense, there appears to be some confusion between the 'source of the authority' of the Constitution and the 'location of the power to amend' the Constitution. Indeed, it might be thought convenient that the 'one body' would exercise both the powers to make and amend the Constitution, as McHugh J in McGinty has asserted. 59 However, as demonstrated by George Winterton, this is not the case in Australia. 60 The Australian people did not make the Constitution. Their role was limited to approving the original draft Constitution; 'albeit without legal effect'. 61 • Secondly, the people's will in s 128 is expressed as residents of the component units of the federation, the States, and not in a conglomerate mass of national citizens. 62 As such it is accepted that Australia enjoys popular sovereignty of some sort in s 128 of the Constitution. However, the preferable view is to adopt the words of Quick and Garran:
In the Constitution of the Commonwealth of course there is no absolute sovereignty, but a quasi-sovereignty which resides in the people of the Commonwealth, who may express their will on constitutional questions through a majority of the electors voting and a majority of the States. 63 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 57 See below n 147 and accompanying text for other arguments suggested to sustain the theory of popular sovereignty as the source of authority of the Constitution; ie, approval of the Constitution by 'acceptance' and/or by 'referenda'. 58 See, Fraser, above n 18, 217: 'Section 128 establishes a procedural condition precedent to the exercise of the constituent power vested in the Commonwealth Crown-in-Parliament, not an alternative locus of sovereign authority'. Further, as Professor Winterton has noted, '[t]he s 128 electors derive their authority from the Constitution and, therefore, logically cannot constitute the source of its authority', above n 16, 7 n 47.
59
(1996) 186 CLR 140, 237. In this respect relying on Bryce's notion that 'ultimate sovereignty' resides with 'the authority (whether a Person or Body) which made and can amend the constitution', James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (1901) Vol 2, 53. However Bryce might be thought to be equating 'ultimate' with 'political', because he further attributed 'legal sovereignty' to the legislature (conjointly with the amending body). 60 Winterton, above n 16, 4-5. Nor even in the US for that matter, where that popular constitution is 'amended by means other than a direct, popular vote', Aroney, above n 33, 272 citing Gilbert, above n 40, 67. 
Federal Law Review Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________
• Thirdly, the plenary legal power which many seem to suggest resides in the people, does not in fact exist. Any sovereignty of the Australian populace is certainly not 'equivalent' to that formerly wielded by the Imperial Parliament. 64 It is sufficient to note that the Australian people have only a joint legal role (with the Commonwealth Parliament and the Governor-General) under s 128. 65 The Commonwealth Parliament must initiate constitutional change before the people are invited into the process to either approve or disapprove of the proposed alteration. The people also have a further continuing legal role which they exercise by directly electing both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament at regular elections pursuant to ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution. As such, the people's express role is prescribed and entrenched by the terms of the Constitution, and it is neither necessary nor appropriate to imply any further constitutional role to them. To ascribe an additional legal role to the people adds nothing to the legal validity of the Constitution. 
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The Legal Basis of the Australian Constitution 253 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Acquisition of Autochthony To achieve autochthony, an 'independent future [must be] irrevocably sealed off from the dependent past'. 69 The difficulty of explaining, in an autochthonous sense, Australia's removal from the orbit of the United Kingdom legal system is seemingly aggravated by a number of interrelated factors. The primary concern is the dilemma posed by the question of whose actions should be seen as legally decisive: those of the parent or those of the offspring? Discussed in Part II is the dominance of the traditional understanding of parliamentary sovereignty as 'continuing'. This promotes the view that the parent 'cannot protect its statutes from repeal, because no one sovereign parliament could effectively bind a future sovereign parliament'. 70 On this view the United Kingdom Parliament has not irrevocably ceded legal authority to Australia. However, an alternative to the traditional theory, the 'self-embracing' theory, mentioned above, recognises that the United Kingdom Parliament can limit or terminate its own powers, and therefore its actions can be seen as 'genuinely abdicative'.
There is no absolute standard here. Both versions are comprehensible and neither can be logically preferred for all legal systems. 71 Discussed in Part III is the dominance of a strict view that for any offspring to obtain autochthony, a break in legal continuity must occur. (This is really a corollary of the 'continuing' view of sovereignty). However, a less strict view emanating from the work of Geoffrey Marshall will also be canvassed. 72 It is doubtless true that the power of the Imperial Parliament to pass on its own initiative any legislation that it thought fit extending to Canada remains in theory unimpaired: indeed the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal or disregard s 4 of the Statute.
II. ACTIONS OF THE PARENT: HISTORY AS EQUIVOCAL AND INDEFINITE
As such, s 4 of the Statute was 'not an express abdication of power to legislate for the Dominions, but redefine[d] the legislature which [could] enact a statute extending to a Dominion … to include the relevant organ of the Dominion as well as the three parts of the British Parliament'. 75 It therefore seemed possible to view the sovereignty of parliament as accepting restrictions of manner and form. Much more controversial however would be restrictions of substance.
To be sure, the traditional theory's perceived inadequacies were only brought into sharp focus when the United Kingdom Parliament ultimately purported to divest itself of a portion of its sovereign power and abdicate 76 its ability to legislate for the Dominions. 77 However, Megarry V-C had to admit that even though it would be 'correct in British law' 81 to say that the United Kingdom Parliament 'could as a matter of abstract law' repeal a statute granting independence to a country, 82 it could not do so effectively. This is because any such repeal 'will not make the country dependent once more; what is done is done, and is not undone by revoking the authority to do it'. 83 Similar concerns were also recognised by Murphy J in Bistricic v Rokov 84 where his Honour mooted that the United Kingdom Parliament 'could … repeal the Statute of Westminster … [and] the Constitution Act. But such repeals would have no effect in Australia'. 85 However, there appear subtle variations in the respective reasoning. The Vice-Chancellor seems at pains to maintain the distinction between continuing 'legal validity' and 'practical enforceability' (for the United Kingdom), whilst Murphy J discards legal validity because it cannot conform to, or explain, practical reality. 86 This discarding of legal concerns in favour of practically expedient ones (or the blurring of the two), seems to typify many of the judgments in the 'implied rights cases', which promote popular sovereignty as the new legal basis of the Australian Constitution. However, no matter what putative time is ascribed for the legal sovereignty of the Australian populace, there are both historical and legal problems, as well as 'considerable theoretical difficulties'. In the face of such criticisms, many sponsors see the need to conflate the distinction between 'legality' and 'legitimacy'. 87 Professor Finn has noted, 'Dicey's two sovereignties appear to be coalescing as they did in the United States more than two centuries ago'. 88 However, I would argue that while the 'two sovereignties' can be fused, such momentous problems require and demand a 'clear democratic decision' by the Australian people through the parliamentary democratic process. may be necessary at some future time to consider whether traditional legal theory can properly be regarded as providing an adequate explanation of the process which culminated in the acquisition by Australia of full "independence" and "Sovereignty"'. 87 See, Fraser, above n 18, 222: 'Those who insist that the "real" genesis of the Constitution lies in its acceptance by the Australian people have further eroded the already shaky boundary between law and politics'. 88 Finn, above n 38, 4.
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Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Further, no matter how forcefully legal considerations are eschewed by judges and jurists, theories such as continuing sovereignty, which may be 'suspect' 89 as divorced from reality in their application to Australia, can still exercise considerable influence. This is because 'conventional and practical considerations seem precarious pegs on which to hang the independence of ... any ... modern legal system'. 90 As Marshall has noted: '[W]e are operating at the untested limits of the traditional doctrine'. 91
The self-embracing view Increasingly, many argue that the traditional understanding of sovereignty must give way to a new view described as 'self-embracing'. It is only by adopting this new view that a sovereign parliament (such as Westminster) could be deemed to have brought 'its omnipotence to an end', 92 without the need for intervention by the offspring. Thus it would seem that if the notion of autochthony is to be assessed successfully and decisively in terms of the actions of the parent, the self-embracing view must prevail. Proponents of this theory suggest 'the better view is that without a break in legal authority, the UK Parliament can irrevocably cede authority over an area to a new constitutional structure'. 93 Indeed, there now seems no theoretical or practical justification for the continuing authority of the United Kingdom Parliament.
Such notions were tested when Canada cautiously addressed the exercise of independence, by 'patriating' the BNA Act 1867 (UK) in 1982. 94 But even as late as 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada had acknowledged that the United Kingdom Parliament's powers to legislate for Canada were 'unimpaired' and 'undiminished'. 95 However, as Peter Oliver has noted, the Court did not say, and was not asked to say, 'whether those powers were sovereign in a continuing or self-embracing sense'. 96 The difficulty for Canadians was that patriation took the form of another United Kingdom statute -the Canada Act 1982 (UK) -which was of course 'the gift of the United Kingdom parliament, not the Canadian peoples'. 97 As a result, patriation threw up the paradox that 'the legal continuity represented by Canada's strict adherence to existing legal procedure ... is widely assumed to have achieved a break in continuity'. 98 According to Oliver, this paradox is only resolved by 'consider[ing] the matter not as a question of British constitutional theory ... but rather as a question of Canadian constitutional theory regarding the evolution of the ultimate legal principle of the Canadian legal system'. 99 96 Oliver, above n 71, 3. 97 Joseph, above n 8, 70 and n 1, 412. 98 Oliver, above n 71, 2. 99 Ibid, 13.
2001
The Legal Basis of the Australian Constitution 257 ____________________________________________________________________________________ constitutional theory the answer could only be indefinite or qualified' because 'British legal opinion leaned and arguably still leans toward continuing sovereignty'. 100 Oliver's argument is persuasive and achieves the desired autochthony by recognising that the 'ultimate rule of recognition' 101 of the Canadian legal system has evolved to the point where Westminster sovereignty can be viewed as self-embracing. This is because the ultimate rule of recognition can have a certain core (Parliament is sovereign) but an uncertain penumbra (is it continuing or self-embracing sovereignty?). 102 Given that the penumbral question was always an open question, Oliver explicitly rejects the presence of any break in legal continuity in Canada's arrangements. Oliver therefore eschews the need to use Kelsen's grundnorm. 103 To be sure, an appeal to Kelsen could not comfortably accommodate legal continuity while explaining Canada's legal escape from Westminster sovereignty.
In Australia, much academic writing is supportive of the promotion of popular sovereignty into Australia's fundamental constitutional arrangements, but at the same time is paradoxically reticent about assessing the change as paradigmatic. 104 Similarly, to my knowledge, no High Court Justice has expressly recognised, at least in curial writings, the need to presuppose a new Australian 'ultimate rule of recognition' (or grundnorm for that matter). This is in spite of the fact that some have been able to discern a new popular legal basis for the Constitution.
Like Canada, Australia's independence could also be considered a 'gift of the United Kingdom Parliament, not the Australian peoples'. However, in one sense Australia has gone further than Canada, by re-enacting the Australia Act 1986 (UK). As a result, signs that the High Court is prepared to consider such notions in terms of _____________________________________________________________________________________ 100 Ibid, 19 . See also, Oliver, above n 90, 562. 101 Whilst H L A Hart admitted that his thesis of an ultimate rule of recognition, providing authoritative criteria for the identification of valid legal rules, resembled Kelsen's grundnorm and Salmond's 'ultimate legal principle', validity for him, was a question of fact. Unlike Kelsen's grundnorm, which was a juristic assumption or postulation, the rule of recognition could be established by an appeal to the facts, ie, to the actual practice of the courts and officials of the system. See, Hart, above n 69, 292-293. See also, n 147 below and text accompanying. 102 Oliver, above n 76, 398. 103 The concept of a grundnorm was developed by Hans Kelsen as a pre-supposition in juristic thinking. It is the highest norm in any national legal order, and by identifying it, the jurist is able to interpret all subsidiary norms as valid, and as a non-contradictory field of meaning. All subsidiary norms can be traced hierarchically back to the grundnorm, each subsidiary norm being validated by the norm above it: Hans Kelsen, 105 As pointed out by Anne Twomey, the majority made the assumption that 'the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) is fully effective and that the application of the Australia Act 1986 (UK) may be completely disregarded'. 106 Chris Horan further points out: 'One consequence of [relying on the Commonwealth version of the Australia Act 1986 as effective to remove the last vestiges of Imperial authority] is to avoid the theoretical problems raised by the abdication of sovereignty from a United Kingdom viewpoint'. 107 However, Marshall has suggested that it is the local re-enactment, not the British Act, that may be 'legally redundant'. 108 So too, Professor Zines has noted a dispute over which version is operative, '[i]f s 51(xxxviii) did not support the Australia Act 1986 (Cth), the British Act by nature of its paramount force would'. Moreover, 'any attempt to regard the whole of the Australia Act as based on Commonwealth constitutional power is impossible'. 109 Thus, while the basic precept of an abdicating Westminster Parliament may have gained many adherents, there does not seem to be unanimous agreement on what the 'self-embracing' theory represents. That is whether it can only truly be understood as a matter of Australian, not British, constitutional theory. Moreover, the pervasiveness and seemingly inextinguishable allure of the traditional theory should not be underestimated. For even though many would assert that practically the 'continuing' sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament is unlikely to make a difference, it would be surprising to leave a theoretical explanation of independence unresolved. If it transpires that the traditional view of the parent's sovereignty was to engender most support, the following view would probably obtain: 'Any measure of emancipation at the hands of the Imperial Parliament [for example, the Australia Act 1986 (UK)] ... suffer[s] from the vital flaw that it [is] revocable at the Imperial Parliament's pleasure ... [N] othing that Westminster could do would remove this taint from its gifts'. 110 In the end the better view might be that, any legal consequences of the actions to date by the United Kingdom in respect of autochthony are at best equivocal. As a result, the search for autochthony would likely need to focus on the actions of the offspring, and possibly revolutionary (peaceful and legal) concerns to seal off the past.
III ACTIONS OF THE OFFSPRING: HISTORY IN THE MAKING
As demonstrated by increasing numbers of Australia's near neighbours, the rule of law can too often be a fragile construct. Australia is indeed fortunate to have seen a greater amount of this important constitutional value during its century of evolution from former Dominion to sovereign state. In contemporary Australia, the drive for autochthony is unlikely to be an isolated phenomenon. It will most likely be (although it does not have to be) connected with the desire to achieve republicanism. Other political forces, previously evident in other former self-governing Dominions, such as apartheid in South Africa, conflict with Britain in Ireland, and the drive for independence in India, are not present in Australia. 111 Mark Moshinsky's valuable discussion of possible methods of achieving autochthony identifies a number of methods by which the Constitution Act might be repealed and the Constitution re-enacted as an Act of the Australian Parliament. He concluded that a peaceful legal revolution is the most desirable way for Australia to reenact the Constitution. However, Moshinsky only discussed re-enacting the current monarchic Constitution as an Australian Act. He did not question the effect of removing the Crown in the search for autochthony, but for the purpose of his labours, 'assumed that the Constitution itself would be re-enacted in identical terms'. 112 Whilst this is a possibility, it seems more likely that any Australian constitutionmaking in the twenty-first century will undoubtedly have a republican flavour. Any possible removal of the Crown and substitution with the sovereignty of the people adds another dimension to the task at hand. If this is achieved by unauthorised means there would be negative consequences for legal continuity, but positive consequences for autochthony. If this is achieved by authorised means the converse may be true. 113
The strict view of Autochthony According to the strict view, to achieve autochthony, nothing less than a contrived break in legal continuity will suffice. 114 This is usually undertaken by adopting new constitutional arrangements in a manner unauthorised by the pre-existing constitution. When an offspring initiates such a break (no matter what view the traditional theory takes of the parent's powers), such action may prove to be legally decisive. This is _____________________________________________________________________________________ 111 Moshinsky, above n 1, 151. 112 Ibid, 137. 113 By whatever means it is achieved, the people must be elevated to a legal constitutional role to replace the Crown, so that the arms of government are constantly reminded of where they derive their constitutional power. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ because the offspring has repudiated the very source of its autonomy. A revolutionary shift in the grundnorm occurs and the validity of the new constitutional order cannot be traced by a 'stream of authority' back to the parent. It must therefore be said that the strict view owes much to Kelsenian theory.
Oliver cites the Irish Constitution as an example of a constitution 'no longer connected to Westminster; it now has a root in popular sovereignty'. 115 He then continues, 'this transition was revolutionary (at least in the legal sense) or autochthonous'. 116 So too, some New Zealand commentators (but especially F M Brookfield) have been able to discern a discontinuity by 'disguised revolution' in New Zealand's 1986 independence arrangements. Although sounding drastic, such a 'revolution' would, in the Australian context, be benign as 'all that is required is to change a legal principle without changing in any way the legal behaviour' 117 to replace the weary Imperial turtle with an Australian one. Before, during and after such a peaceful revolution, Australians would still recognise the Constitution as the supreme law of the Commonwealth, and that a 'once only breach in the rule of law is required'. 118 But in enacting a truly autochthonous Constitution, the people should realise they are exercising both their political and legal sovereignty. As a result, the chain of legal continuity that can be traced back (with the exception being from 1649 to 1660) for almost one thousand years, 119 would be broken.
The problem with the strict view requiring a break in continuity is that Australians have shown an unfailing desire to conform to existing constitutional procedures for sanctioning legal change. As such, Australians seem unlikely to adopt a new constitution by unauthorised means. Even so, such conformity in no way prevents the achievement of an Australian republic. Australia's current constitutional arrangements are entirely adequate to facilitate republican change, (even if there is dispute over which particular procedures should be used). But, if autochthony is the goal, more is needed. To this end, is there a way for Australians to 'have their constitutional cake and eat it too?' 120
Repeal of the Constitution Act to achieve autochthony (the strict view modifiedevolutionary in process but revolutionary in effect) What would be the effect of a Commonwealth Act passed pursuant to s 15(1) of the Australia Acts which purported to repeal -not merely amend -the Constitution Act? 121 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 115 Oliver, above n 90, 560. Oliver is thus in agreement with Wheare above n 2, Joseph above n 1 and Moshinsky above n1. 116 Oliver, above n 90, 560. 117 Scott, above n 41, 249. 118 Oliver, above n 90, 608. 119 Justice Kirby has noted this (almost) unbroken legal lineage of a millennium. Michael Kirby, 'The Struggle for Simplicity, Lord Cooke and Fundamental Rights', paper delivered to the New Zealand Legal Research Foundation Conference, April 1997 from web, 29/01/99, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cooke.htm; 2. Others would however suggest other discontinuities also, eg, 1688-89. 120 Oliver, above n 76, 392. 
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The Legal Basis of the Australian Constitution 261 ____________________________________________________________________________________ It is not explicitly clear that merely amending, or even repealing, s 8 of the Statute of Westminster will authorise the repeal of the Constitution Act. 122 Stephen Gageler and Mark Leeming 123 are of the opinion that the Constitution Act can be repealed (by the use of s 15 and other necessary provisions) as easily as it can be amended. 124 Could such action secure autochthony? Moshinsky concluded that, according to the strict view, such an authorised process would not amount to a break in legal continuity and therefore could not achieve true autochthony. 125 However, I would favour an interpretation that repeal of the Constitution Act by this process could secure autochthony.
A repeal of the Constitution Act in toto would mean that it would be 'no longer possible for the [offspring] to invoke a logically prior [parental] legislative power'. 126 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
By contrast, it could be argued the Constitution Alteration (Establishment of Republic) 1999 (Cth) did not purport to deprive the Constitution Act of legal force. The Constitutional Convention had recommended that any provisions of the Constitution Act that have no continuing force or relevance, should be repealed However, the Constitution (Requests) Bill 1999 (Qld) requested the Commonwealth not to repeal either the long title, the enacting words, the short title (covering clause 1) and covering clause 9 which contains the Constitution itself. According to the Bill, only covering clauses 2 to 8 should be repealed (clauses 5 and 6 were in fact to be incorporated into the Constitution itself; ss 126 and 127) and the existing preamble omitted.
The Commonwealth Parliament has not legislated in response to these requests and moreover, the Commonwealth was apparently relaxed about the need to delete the existing preamble (see, Constitutional Alteration (Preamble) Bill 1999 (Cth)) and most of the covering clauses. However, even in light of the more stringent requests from the States, the retention of the long and short titles meant that the Constitution Act would have remained in force, and further, still derived its legal authority from the Westminster Parliament. 122 This is due in part to the uncertainty surrounding the true scope and effect of s 2(2) of the 
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Federal Law Review Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Such repeal would repudiate the source of Australia's legislative autonomy and deny a legislative gift was ever made. The effect would be that the Constitution Act no longer has any legal force in Australia. With the Constitution Act removed from the constitutional landscape, the only claim to authority of the Australian Constitution would spring from within Australia itself. As a result, a claim could be made that a break in legal continuity took place. In other words, the process would be 'evolutionary' (not being based on a revolutionary assertion of power) but the effect would be 'revolutionary'. 127 This accords with Marshall's view (to be discussed shortly) that an offspring may claim a break in legal continuity even though the process relied upon ultimately derived from an externally-prior legislative power. After all, whether legal continuity has been broken or not may well be the subject of differences of opinion.
However, since the current constitutional arrangements do contain a significant democratic element, it would be necessary to obtain substantial popular approval. If popular approval was obtained in all the States, 128 at least two benefits would result. First, it could be said that the now solitary Constitution (or any new constitution subsequently enacted) would have been adopted by the spontaneous will of the people. It 'would appear on its face to be an expression of the national will' 129 but really expressed in the units of States. Secondly, the judiciary would not be placed in a difficult position as a popular 'majority in all six States would [effectively] place the legitimacy of the new order beyond doubt'. 130 Further, Moshinsky has noted, 'a constitutional change designed to achieve autochthony has inherent validity'. 131
Declaration of autochthony (a 'disguised' constitutional revolution)
If Australians were of a mind to institute a 'technical' break in legal continuity, the following course might be undertaken. James Thomson cites Geoffrey Sawer as suggesting: 132 Perhaps the best way of dealing with this is to put to the people as a constitutional amendment a declaratory provision stating that the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament ends on a named future date and is replaced by that of the Australian people.
This sort of proposal has a great deal to commend it. Had such a proposal been put to the people and accepted to take effect from 3 March 1986, the constitutional arrangements of Australia (in respect of grundnorm and autochthony issues) might no longer be in such hot academic debate. In the end, however, the Australia Acts alone could only achieve so much. By s 1 the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament was brought to an end, thereby fulfilling the first proposition of Professor Sawer's proposal. However, their failure to use 'unauthorised means' spelt disaster for _____________________________________________________________________________________ 127 Joseph, above n 1, 122. See also, Oliver, above n 76, 391. 128 As Moshinsky, above n 1, 151 has noted: '[I]t would have to be considered whether popular approval need also be received from a majority of voters in each State as it is arguable that it is in units of States that the popular will is expressed in Australia as a federation'.
(emphasis added) Thus Moshinsky concludes (and I agree) that to obtain popular approval in all the States would be politically 'cautious' and 'desirable'. So too, Aroney has said '[T]he ultimate reason for turning to unanimity for the alteration [and repeal] of the Constitution Act is that it embodies the formative basis of the federation': above n 33, 290. 129 Moshinsky, above n 1, 150. 130 Aroney, above n 33, 271. 131 Moshinsky, above n 1, 149. 132 Thomson, above n 114, 344-345, n 138 (emphasis added).
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The Legal Basis of the Australian Constitution 263 ____________________________________________________________________________________ autochthony, (but was a vindication for the most important constitutional value -the rule of law). Moreover, the failure to invest legal sovereignty democratically in the Australian people makes contestable the identity of the true beneficiary of the power formerly exercised by the United Kingdom Parliament.
However, this does not mean that Australia cannot adopt such a course even today. A plebiscite (then referendum) question could include a declaratory provision similar to that suggested by Professor Sawer, along with a Constitution Alteration Bill for Australia to become a republic. The declaratory provision should assert that 'all the prerogatives of the Crown and the sovereignty of the Queen are transferred to the people'. 133 Further, as Moshinsky has suggested: '[T]he Australian Parliament, probably after having secured popular approval, [could] declare the Constitution Act no longer has any legal force in Australia…'. 134 This could be achieved by repealing the Constitution Act as discussed above, thereby enhancing the claim for autochthony. So too, the requirement for popular approval in all the States should be insisted upon. 135 It is argued such a course of action could put to rest many of the strictly legal views noted throughout this article, and bring other opportunities forward. Primarily, the Crown is replaced with the sovereignty of the people, and as such the people constitute both the political and legal bases of the Constitution. In other words, the Constitution is proclaimed in the name of the people. 136 Further, the whole process, including a successful plebiscite or referendum, the declaration, the repeal of the Constitution Act and the enactment of a new constitution, could be seen as a fundamental repudiation of the existing legal order thereby securing autochthony by a 'technical' break in legal continuity, and a 'disguised revolution'. 137 At this point, I concede that some might consider it doubtful whether a declaration that is based on a United Kingdom derived power can be effectively revolutionary.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 133 Such an assertion of popular sovereignty might take in part, the following form:
'Whereas all the constitutional authority ever possessed by the monarchs of the Crown of England and later imposed by the monarchs of the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over the Commonwealth of Australia, such allegiance is hereby withdrawn, and is now vested in the sovereign people of the Commonwealth Republic of Australia.' (Adapted in small part from the Constitution of New Jersey 1776). 134 Moshinsky, above n 1, 149. 135 In terms of the Australian Commonwealth becoming a republic, such unanimity would in practice give one State the power of veto. Although on the other hand, for the sake of the unity of the federation, all the constituent elements should agree to become republican at the same time. 136 As a result, the people can deal with their fundamental rights as they wish. They can place their faith in whichever institution they believe will best protect their liberty; that is, a parliament or a court. Varying methods might be utilised to protect judicially enforceable rights. A Bill of Rights (constitutionally entrenched or statutory) might be enacted. Rights may even be reserved (as distinct from those surrendered) by provisions similar to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Australians could also embrace indigenous reconciliation issues in any new constitutional arrangements, perhaps reflected in a treaty. Although, as Professor Finn noted, collective popular sovereignty 'poses a direct obstacle to acceptance of sovereignty in indigenous Australians', above n 38, 5. 137 Wade, above n 40, [191] [192] [193] [194] [195] [196] [197] .
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Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ This is because the old order is not intentionally violated by a revolutionary assertion of power. However, I argue that the important aspect to consider in the declaratory process is that the old order is violated not by unauthorised legislative means, but by the people withdrawing allegiance to the sovereign constitutional authority possessed by the current monarch. Lastly, as a consequence, academic observers of this process might be constrained to posit a new ultimate rule of recognition (or even grundnorm) in order to explain the validity of the new legal system.
Professor Sawer also noted that if such a measure as the declaratory procedure is not adopted 'we may find yet the High Court in a suitable case ... doing it for us by a sort of judicial UDI, taking effect on the date of the decision'. 138 It would appear that this scenario has exercised a marked attraction for some members of the High Court. As a result of some judgments in the 'implied rights cases', it could be asked whether the High Court has already altered Australia's constitutional arrangements. 139
A less strict view of Autochthony: Marshall's criteria Geoffrey Marshall has argued that there is no need for an unauthorised break to secure autochthony. In his 1971 work he identified three criteria of autochthony. Further, according to Marshall, legal continuity (or more accurately, lack of it), is only one criterion. Thus, autochthony may still be achievable even without the enactment of new constitutional arrangements by unauthorised means. Marshall's criteria are: 140 (i) whether all processes for constitutional change are locally operated; (ii) whether in the enactment [and arguably amendment and repeal] of constitutional provisions, legal continuity has been broken (or claims made that it has been broken); (iii) whether with or without (i) or (ii), the people or possibly the bench, regard the constitution as authoritative because of acceptance of it.
Phillip Joseph and F M Brookfield have profitably applied these criteria to New Zealand, Joseph concluding that 'the Constitution would be autochthonous according to the first and third of Marshall's criteria'. 141 140 Marshall, above n 19, 58-60 (emphasis added). 141 Joseph, above n 1, 412, 414. Hogg, above n 2 has applied Marshall's criteria to Canada.
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The Legal Basis of the Australian Constitution 265 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Joseph's claim, 142 but also recognises the break in legal continuity brought about by the Constitution Act 1986 (NZ), 143 referred to in the second criterion. The question of whether similar claims might be made for the present constitutional system of Australia is now considered.
Australia's position as measured against the Criteria
Criterion (i) 'Whether all processes for constitutional change are locally operated'. As Joseph has stated, '[w]hether all processes for constitutional change are locally operated ... appears to be an indicium of autonomy rather than autochthony'. 144 Thus, as argued above, to equate the popular provisions in s 128 with the achievement of autochthony does not necessarily follow. However, even if this criterion is considered an indicium of autochthony, I nonetheless dispute the view that s 128 is the best measure of it. This is in view of s 128's inability to amend or alter the Constitution Act. In other words, the location of a power to amend the Constitution -in contrast to the power to amend all of Australia's basic constitutive documents -might not be the best indicium of autochthony. However, since s 15(1) of the Australia Acts (admittedly in conjunction with other provisions) can be used to amend and even repeal both the Constitution Act and the Constitution (with the appropriate popular support), s 15(1) is a better measure of both municipal sovereignty and autochthony. 145 According to this view, Australia has been autochthonous since 1986. However, by virtue of the state unanimity required in s 15(1) it would be a type of autochthony based upon the federal compact not any form of social contract giving rise to popular sovereignty.
Criterion (ii) '
Whether in the enactment of constitutional provisions, legal continuity has been broken (or claims made that it has been broken)'. Australia is not presently autochthonous as assessed against this criterion; legal continuity has not been broken. However, Marshall only requires the offspring to claim that continuity has been broken. It is not necessary to point to any specific unauthorised enactments. This criterion seems to accommodate the Canadian situation, where some make such a claim, but paradoxically there are no unauthorised procedures. In Australia, unless the assertions of popular sovereignty can be seen to
Federal Law Review
Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ represent such a claim, more is required. However, this criterion could be used to explain the repeal of the Constitution Act (and a declaration of popular sovereignty) as outlined above. 146 A claim that continuity had been broken could be made, even though the process utilised was authorised. Such a process might allow Australians to preserve both legality and legitimacy, while at the same time achieving autochthony. First, the use of s 15 of the Australia Acts would allow respect for the rule of law as represented by legal continuity. Secondly, requiring state unanimity in obtaining popular approval would allow respect for federalism and democracy. It remains to be seen whether Australians are as unwilling to claim breaks in legal continuity as they are unwilling to cause them.
Criterion (iii) Acceptance by acquiescence: 'Whether the bench regards the Constitution as authoritative because of acceptance of it'. This criterion seems to encapsulate Hart's notion of a change in the rule of recognition. 147 According to Hart, the rule of recognition 'could… change over time, in accordance with the courts' and officials' changing attitudes towards that which should be recognised as valid law in the legal system ... but Hart provided little insight into how that transformation might take place'. 148 Joseph noted that each legal system must ask itself: 'What is the courts' and officials' internal viewpoint?' 149 However, Hart devotes only one paragraph to the situation where 'the unity among officials [and courts] ... may partly breakdown'. He notes, '[i]t may be that, over certain constitutional issues ... there is a division within the official world ultimately leading to a division [over the content of the rule of recognition] among the judiciary'. 150 All that could be done, according to Hart, 'would be to describe the situation ... and note it as a substandard, abnormal case containing within it the threat that the legal system will dissolve'. 151 Although Hart's strong language was directed to the constitutional crisis that gripped South Africa in 1954, 152 the 'persistent doctrinal confusion over the sources of legitimate constitutional authority in Australia' 153 could be seen as a 'partial failure of the normal conditions… [of] congruence…'. 154 Further, it is not clear that a majority of Australians, including officials, view the original enactment of the Constitution in the Constitution Act as merely an 'historical fact'. 155 This is despite Hart's assertions that a 'local root' is established when the Westminster Parliament no longer has the ability to legislate for a former Dominion. 156 Moreover, while it is possible to discern a majority of High Court Justices that do
Volume 29 ____________________________________________________________________________________ by referenda (to be discussed shortly) and current 'acquiescence' as the touchstones of popular sovereignty. It is noted that Professor Zines's and the Commission's view have the attraction of recognising the original authority of the British Parliament. 162 Professor Zines's view has the further attraction of not necessarily promoting a 'norm higher than the Constitution' itself. 163 Geoffrey Lindell's view that the legally binding character of the Constitution is now derived from the will of the people has a further attraction. It is presented as an 'additional though not necessarily alternative, way of explaining the binding nature of the Constitution.' 164 165 have none of these attractions. Indeed, the correctness of Murphy J's view in Kirmani has been questioned as being inherently and manifestly improbable. 166 Moreover, Deane J (in Theophanous) used Lindell's discussion as an alternative rather than additional argument, which Lindell specifically cautioned against. 167 As such, this whole acceptance argument is not without difficulties. Even Marshall has noted the word 'acceptance' is ambiguous. 168 Accordingly, the 'acceptance' or 'acquiescence' argument is to be given the short answer that at most it explains in political terms -not in legal terms -why the Constitution is binding. This is so for at least three interrelated reasons. The first reason has been consistently alluded to by Dawson J: there is a cogent argument for maintaining a firm distinction between 'legality' and 'legitimacy'. The legal reasons for obedience to the Constitution may not be the same as the moral reasons for obedience. As such, it is no contradiction for one to assert that, as a matter of legal theory, the legal basis of the Constitution is its passage through the Imperial Parliament, while at the same time one recognises that, as an abstract proposition of political theory, one actually accepts and obeys the Constitution because it is Australia's fundamental law. 169 The motive for obeying the Constitution (the moral justification) is to be found in the study of political obligation (the concept of 'authority' is probably more helpful than 'sovereignty'). 170 However, the validity of the Constitution is to be found in the study of legal theory supported by history. In the language of Hart and Kelsen, the 'previous rule of recognition [or historically first constitution] remains a necessary means to identify the content of currently valid law'. 171 Secondly, proponents of the 'acceptance' view can provide no empirical data to confirm such an assertion. In fact there is such data existing directly rebutting the theory: 'just under one in five Australians have some idea of what the Constitution
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The Legal Basis of the Australian Constitution 269 ____________________________________________________________________________________ contains ... [which] cannot amount to maintenance of the Constitution by the acquiescence of the people'. 172 It would seem that to have any credence, the acceptance theory would need to at least show a 'bare majority of Australians' adhere to it. Consider a question posed to Australians as to why they still considered the Constitution as Australia's fundamental law? Some, if not many, might answer that the Constitution was, and still is law because it had been enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament. 173 This would not be an incorrect answer. 174 Thirdly, and as a corollary, one cannot be sure that the attitude of the Australian people has changed sufficiently to transform the rule of recognition to one based on popular acceptance.
The complexity of explaining the acceptance of the Australian Constitution has been well noted. 175 This is because the legal and political sources of constitutional authority are not one and the same. In the United States they are, and as a result, the notion of acceptance by a contemporary society seems especially applicable to the US Constitution. Even though the 'We The People' of today played no part in the adoption of the US Constitution, there is no other authoritative source to invoke but the 'mundane adherence to the status quo'. Thus in both legal and political theory 'the [US] Constitution is authoritative because [Americans] believe and act as if it is'. 176
Criterion (iii) Adoption by referenda
Daley has noted, '[i]f the crucial characteristic of popular will is the effective power to bring about legal change, then sovereignty must have been transferred much earlier than the passage of the Australia Acts'. 177 However, arguments that promote the Australian populace as sovereign sometime before 1986, might represent 'very quaint aberration [s] ... of constitutional history'. 178 Indeed, such arguments can be questioned on a number of levels. First, sponsors who assert that the popular vote approving the draft Constitution is the legal authority of the Constitution, have to contend with arguments that the vote was hardly popular. 179 Secondly, even though the Constitution was on one level approved by the Australian electors, such action should only be seen as a 'mere antecedent historical circumstance'. 180 The newly agreed upon
